Assistant Professor of Economics
NYU Stern School of Business
I am a microeconomic theorist at New York University’s Stern School of Business. Before joining NYU Stern in 2014, I worked at Washington University’s Olin Business School and at Microsoft Research New England. I earned my PhD in Economics from Yale University.
I work at the intersection of game theory and industrial organization, with a primary focus on dynamic mechanism design. My research studies the optimal design of contracts, auctions, and markets in the presence of persistent information asymmetries.
“Progressive Screening: Long-Term Contracting with a Privately Known Stochastic Process” (with Raphael Boleslavsky), Review of Economic Studies, 2013, 80(1), 1-34
“Auctions with Dynamic Populations: Efficiency and Revenue Maximization,” Journal of Economic Theory, 2012, 147(6), 2419-2438
“Sequential Auctions with Randomly Arriving Buyers,” Games and Economic Behavior, 2011, 73(1), 236-243