Assistant Professor of Economics
NYU Stern School of Business
I am a microeconomic theorist at New York University Stern School of Business, which I joined in July 2014. Before joining NYU Stern, I worked at the Olin Business School at Washington University in St. Louis, and earlier as a postdoctoral researcher at Microsoft Research New England. I received my Ph.D. in Economics from Yale University.
My work is at the intersection of game theory and industrial organization, with a primary focus on dynamic mechanism design and dynamic auctions. My research explores the optimal design of auctions, contracts, and markets in the presence of persistent informational asymmetries.
“Progressive Screening: Long-Term Contracting with a Privately Known Stochastic Process” (with Raphael Boleslavsky), Review of Economic Studies, 2013, 80(1), 1-34
“Auctions with Dynamic Populations: Efficiency and Revenue Maximization,” Journal of Economic Theory, 2012, 147(6), 2419-2438
“Sequential Auctions with Randomly Arriving Buyers,” Games and Economic Behavior, 2011, 73(1), 236-243